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As co-editor, I dedicate this special issue to Wibo van
Rossum, who sadly passed away during the making of it.
Wibo initiated this special issue and, despite his grave ill-
ness, was determined to help accomplish it. The idea of
editing this special issue originated from the annual con-
ference of the Dutch Law and Society Association
(VSR) that we organised in Rotterdam in 2016 together
with Roel Pieterman and Nick Huls. In 2017, with
Hilke Grootelaar, we edited a special issue for the jour-
nal of the VSR, Recht der Werkelijkheid, entitled Recht
als probleemoplossing? (The Law as Troubleshooter?).
This indicates that I have collaborated with Wibo on dif-
ferent occasions, also during his illness. Doing so was
always a great pleasure and Wibo has been an example
to me in the dignified and resilient manner in which he
carried on to doing the work he loved so much, with pas-
sion until the end.
At the end of the last century, a movement emerged on
the legal scholarship landscape in the United States that
is often referred to as Empirical Legal Research (ELR).
This breakthrough in the status quo within the research
field of law has since aroused debate and raised ques-
tions. Some of these questions arise from the need to
better understand this new movement. How can the rise
of ELR be explained? What are its main characteristics?
Who is part of it? Does this movement also spread out-
side the US? If so, where and how? The rise of ELR
also leads to reflection on the existing research field of
the law. How does ELR relate to legal scholarship, the
Law and Society (L&S) movement and (New) Legal
Realism? What does the emergence of the ELR move-
ment imply for the established institutional and power
relations within the research field? Since, at least at the
beginning, ELR was thought to focus more on quantita-
tive research methods and to take a less critical and
more instrumental stance towards the study of the law
than already existing empirical research traditions, it
also gives cause for reflection on more fundamental
questions about the study of the law. The first question
is epistemological: how do empirical legal research and
legal scholarship compare? Next is the ontological ques-
tion of how law and empiricism relate to each other. In
other words, the rise of ELR elicits reflection in various
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ways. The answer to these questions, about ELR itself,
about the positioning of ELR within the research field
and about the relationship between law and empiricism
and the investigation thereof, can be sought in various
ways, has not yet been found in many respects or is con-
troversial. In the four contributions to this special issue,
three of the more fundamental questions are addressed
that are prompted by the emergence of ELR.
The first question concerns the relationship between
law and empiricism. One way of characterising this rela-
tionship is the well-known dictum ‘law in books and law
in action.’ The conception of ‘law in action’ is associated
with Legal Realism, which examines the role of law, not
just as it exists in the statutes and cases, but as it is
actually applied in society. The law may contain ideals
to strive for, but research on the social practice of law
has made clear that the law is fooling itself, because it
contains a lot of mechanisms that make sure those ideals
remain ideals.1 Danielle Chevalier shows in her contri-
bution to this special issue that the prevailing distinction
between ‘law in books and law in action’ does not do
justice to the relationship between the way in which the
law is formalised, perceived and lived. Though the
mutual constitution between law and practice is nowa-
days commonly professed, the reflex remains to use law
in books as starting point. It is argued, however, in this
article that law has a storyline that commences before its
institutional formalisation. Law as ‘a continuous process
of becoming’ encompasses both law in books and law in
action, and law in action encompasses timelines both
before and after the formal coming about of law. To
fully understand law, it is necessary to understand the
entire storyline of law. To illustrate this, an ethnograph-
ic case study of a local by-law regulating an ethnic
diverse public space of everyday life is expanded upon.
The case study is used to demonstrate the dynamics in
which law comes about and how these dynamics contin-
ue for law in action after law has made the books. This
particular case study exemplifies how law is one of many
truths in the context in which it operates and how for-
malised law is, above all, reflective of the power constel-
lations that have brought it forth.
There is another manner in which the relationship
between law and empiricism can be conceived. On a
more abstract level, it can be reformulated as that
between law and its environment. This latter relation-
1. D.E. Ingersoll, ‘American Legal Realism and Sociological Jurisprudence:
The Methodological Roots of a Science of Law’, 17 Journal of the His-
tory of the Behavioral Sciences (1981), at 491.
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ship is central to the so-called system theory. According
to this theory, a process of functional differentiation
brings forth specialised subsystems (such as law, poli-
tics, science, religion) that fulfil an exclusive function
that none of the other subsystems can take over. More-
over, the subsystems are self-regulating: from their own
survival strategy they derive which signals from the
environment they respond to.2 According to Luhmann,
systems are cognitively open and operationally closed.3
This means that they are sensitive to and respond to sig-
nals from the environment but that they interpret them
from their own operational criteria, i.e., the way in
which the system is organised. For a new signal, for
example an empirical finding, to reach the legal system,
it must be recognised as legally relevant by the law. The
law itself determines which actions are considered legal
acts (norms) and which mere factual actions
(facts).Whereas other-reference ensures the system’s
cognitive openness towards its environment, self-refer-
ence ensures its normative closure.
How are empirical observations entered into the opera-
tional logic of the law? Case files, for example, play an
important role here. ‘[T]he case file authorizes and
authenticates, ascribes actions to actors and thereby
enrols them in the legal case, and it references events
and persons in such a way as to attribute legal-factual
status to them so that they, too, are enrolled in the
workings of the legal case.… Approached as such, the
legal case file can further understanding of how “law”
establishes itself in relation to a world it references as
“outside” but that it, by so referencing, can only deal
with as a world enrolled in law, that is, as a legally
domesticated world.’4 Van Berkel en Van Lochem’s
contribution to this special issue illustrates that also the
process of drafting regulatory policies can help elucidate
how a border between law and empiricism is enacted.
Inherent to all regulatory policymaking is that a ‘jump’
has to be made from empirical facts (i.e. other referenc-
ing) to normative recommendations of what the law
should regulate (i.e. self-referencing). For example, the
observations that there are too few organ donors in the
Netherlands and that the voluntary registration system
is not working has to be translated into normative rec-
ommendations of what the law should regulate (e.g. we
need to change the default rule so that everybody in
principle becomes an organ donor unless one opts out).
The authors analyse how this translation process takes
place and whether it makes a difference if the empirical
research on which legislative drafts are built concerns
predominantly quantitative or qualitative research. By
using the lens of the proportionality principle – which
requires that proposals for new legislation are suited to
2. N. Huls, Actie en reactie: Een inleiding in de rechtssociologie (Action
and Reaction: An introduction in the Sociology of Law), (2009) Den
Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, at 70-74.
3. N. Luhmann, Das recht der gesellschaft (The Law of Society), (1993)
Verlag: Suhrkamp.
4. I. Van Oorschot and W. Schinkel, ‘The Legal Case File as Border Object:
On Self-Reference and Other-Reference in Criminal Law’, 42 Journal of
Law and Society 4 (2015), at 501.
accomplish the aims of the legislature, do not require
more intrusive measures than strictly necessary to reach
these aims, and will not produce excessive burdens for
particular addressees of the rules – in a case study of
each type, they conclude that the manner in which
empirical data and scientific evidence are used by legis-
lative drafters to justify normative choices in the design
of new laws fail to meet the proportionality test.
As noted, the rise of ELR with its alleged focus on
quantitative research methods and addressing practical
policy issues apolitically gives reason to reflect on the
way in which law and empiricism relate to each other.
The first two articles from this special issue make a val-
uable contribution to a better understanding of this rela-
tionship. Chevalier shows that the mutual influence of
‘law in books and law in action’ is a dynamic process
where the formalisation of legislation is neither the
beginning nor the end. Van Berkel and Van Lochem
show that the way in which legislative drafters pick up
signals from the environment and convert them into
legal rationality usually does not meet the terms against
which their own operational actions are evaluated.
The second question addressed in this special issue con-
cerns the relationship between a legal and an empirical
study of the law. Does empirical legal research gain
importance? There are several reasons to assume that it
indeed thrives.
First, legal scholarship may contribute to the growth of
empirical legal research. It took a long time for legal
scholarship to acquire a respectable and self-evident
position within the academic community. It was only
after it had succeeded in achieving this status that scope
for empirical legal research emerged in law faculties. In
combination with the emergence of the social sciences as
discrete fields of study and the development of related
methodologies, the maturation of law as an academic
discipline seems to have been a driver for empirical legal
research.5 The fact that leading scholars in legal facul-
ties plead for more empirical research may also have
contributed to empirical legal research as status enhanc-
ing and therefore rendering law faculties eager to take
the lead in international and interdisciplinary research.
Second, legal practice may contribute to the growth of
empirical legal research. During their education and on-
the-job training, lawyers are confronted with research
that teaches them more about their own functioning or
provides insight into problems and developments that
they face in their daily work. Moreover, they are con-
fronted with litigants and expert witnesses who provide
empirical data in court cases that judges must be able to
judge. The environment also expects them to have the
capacity to properly evaluate these empirical data.
These concerns have led to the need and desire for
empirical research that judges can draw from when
making their decisions.6 Incidentally, a caveat must be
5. M. Heise, ‘The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism’, University of Illinois
Law Review 4 (2002).
6. Ibid., at 832.
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entered in relation to this factor. Although research
shows that lawyers occasionally learn about empirical
research, consider themselves capable of understanding
it and understand its importance, they still make little
use of it in practice.7 Insofar as the legal practice is
responsible for the growth of empirical legal research,
nonetheless, the increasing availability of data, for
example, as a result of the digitisation of the judiciary
obviously also contributes to it.8
Third, law and economics may have boosted empirical
legal research. Since the 1960s, economic theory has
been successfully applied to the law. The predominant
assumption of law and economics was that individuals
make rational choices in response to incentives that
emanate from legal instruments. From this assumption
theoretical predictions are derived and recommenda-
tions made for the optimisation of legal instruments.
This assumption of the rational actor has been prob-
lematised for some decades now by behavioral scientists
who study the law empirically.9 These behavioral scien-
tists are dominated by lawyer-economists and psycholo-
gists who mainly do large-scale quantitative and experi-
mental research. Their research has demonstrated that
the assumption of the rational actor is problematic since
the will power, rationality and egoism of actors in their
responses to legal instruments are bounded. The dissat-
isfaction about the assumption of the rational actor in
law and economics thus seems to have played an inde-
pendent role in the growth of empirical legal research.10
Have these factors actually led to a demonstrable growth
of empirical legal research? Several studies to which Van
Dijck, Sverdlov and Buck refer in their contribution to
this special issue show that there has indeed been an
increase in empirical legal research in the US. The
question of whether this growth also applies to Europe
has not yet been systematically investigated, according
to these researchers. They have taken on the task of
finding out. They make a distinction between legal and
empirical legal research on the basis of the research
method and the use of data that are reported in the arti-
cles that they rely on in their study. Based on a content
analysis of 78 journals, they establish that there has not
been an increase in empirical research in Europe
between 2008 and 2017. They address the potential rea-
sons for this absence of growth and discuss how its
obstacles can be alleviated. Hereby they mention the
availability of data, training and the formulation of
questions that are relevant to the legal practice. Their
findings subsequently raise the question whether the
7. N. Elbers, M. Malsch, P. Van Der Laan, A.J. Akkermans & C. Bijleveld,
‘Empirisch-juridisch onderzoek in Nederland: Bespiegelingen over de
stand van zaken in de rechtswetenschap, het juridisch onderwijs en de
rechtspraktijk’ (‘Empirical-Legal Research in the Netherlands: Reflections
about the State of the Art in Jurisprudence, Legal Education, and the
Legal Practice’), 39 Recht Der Werkelijkheid 1 (2018).
8. C.L. Boyd, ‘In Defense of Empirical Legal Studies’, 63 Buffalo Law
Review (2015), at 371-72.
9. P. Mascini, ‘Responses of Law and Economics to the Threat of Its Initial
Success’, Law and Method (2018), doi:10.5553/REM/.000032.
10. R. Lempert, ‘Growing Up in Law and Society: The Pulls of Policy and
Methods’, 9 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2013), at 13.
presumed drivers of empirical legal research mentioned
earlier may also be limited to the US.
The last question addressed in this special issue con-
cerns the way in which the ELR movement and other
research traditions dealing with the empirical study of
the law substantively relate to each other. In this discus-
sion it is rightly pointed out that the law was studied
empirically long before ELR emerged. That research
took place around the beginning of the twentieth centu-
ry, mainly in the US, under the heading of Legal Real-
ism. Today it is being continued under the heading of
New Legal Realism11 or European New Legal Real-
ism.12 Subsequently, the L&S movement was establish-
ed in the early 1960s. In some respects the ELR move-
ment is considered a reaction to the L&S movement.
ELR caught the attention of lawyers because the new
movement seemed to promise research on legally rele-
vant facts without too much social theory, and without
the usual criticism of the deficiencies of law. These last
characterisations of ‘focus on social theory’ and ‘critical
about the deficiencies of law’ are typical for much of the
L&S movement.13 The L&S movement with its broad
interest in immigration law, development in crime, gen-
der issues, the North-South divide and global develop-
ment, social and economic inequality, the functioning of
the legal profession and of courts, inclusion and exclu-
sion of citizens through law etc., has conducted empiri-
cal research for many decades. But it has done so almost
always with an eye on developing theoretical positions in
social theory and speaking critically to power with the
aim of furthering justice for marginalised and sup-
pressed individuals and minorities. ELR presented itself
as freed from the ballast of social theory and critique. It
claims to pose more pragmatic questions than L&S
research, with more focus on policy and practical rele-
vance and less focus on theory.14 Moreover, methodo-
logically, ELR appears to be less pluriform than L&S
research. Certainly in the US and at the first European
Conference on Empirical Legal Research, the emphasis
was on quantitative research.15 Or so it is perceived.
These perceptions contain elements that feed tensions
in the L&S movement that may feel it is overhauled, in
the ELR movement that may feel wrongly shelved as
being a-theoretical, and in legal scholarship that may be
afraid to miss the train to new legal methodologies and
theories about law.
11. H. Dagan and R. Kreitner, ‘The New Legal Realism and the Realist View
of Law’, 43 Law & Social Inquiry 2 (2018).
12. J. v. Holtermann and M.R. Madsen, ‘What Is Empirical in Empirical
Studies of Law? A European New Legal Realist Conception’, 39 Retfærd
4 (2016).
13. K. Van Aeken, ‘Sociology of Law in Search of a Distinct Identity’, 36
Recht Der Werkelijkheid 1 (2015).
14. G. Van Dijck, ‘Naar een succesformule voor empirisch-juridisch onder-
zoek’ (‘Towards a Success Formula for Empirical-Legal Research’), 42
Justitiële Verkenningen 6 (2016), at 31 and D. Blocq and M Van Der
Woude ‘Empirisch-juridisch onderzoek’ (‘Empirical Legal Research’), 38
Recht Der Werkelijkheid 3 (2017), at 33-34.
15. T. George, ‘An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top
Law Schools’, 81 Indiana Law Journal (2006), at 141.
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In reality, the foregoing story is not black and white. In
the first place because the two movements do not mani-
fest themselves everywhere in the same way. For
instance in Germany unlike in the US, empirical legal
scholars may find themselves outsiders in relation to the
legal community, as their work is not readily considered
relevant for legal scholarship (Rechtswissenschaft), which
is usually regarded as a normative enterprise.16 In the
Netherlands, the Empirical Legal Scholarship initiative
(ELSi) seems to be methodologically inclusive and,
above all, opting for a pragmatic approach with a focus
on promoting empirical legal research rather than insti-
gating a fundamental reflection on the relationship
between legal science and empirical legal research.17
Secondly, Van der Woude and Blocq show in their con-
tribution to this issue that empirical research traditions
are evolving. Their contribution to this special issue
relates to the relationship between the ELR movement
and the L&S movement. The article departs from the
observation that the ELR movement, understood as an
initiative that emerged in American law schools in the
early 2000s, has been quite successful in generating
more attention to the empirical study of law and legal
institutions in law schools, both within and outside the
United States. In the early years of its existence, the
L&S movement – as mentioned, another important site
for the empirical study of law and legal institutions –
also had its centre of gravity inside the law schools. But
over time, it shifted towards the social sciences. This
article discusses how that happened and goes on to
explain how the L&S movement became ever more
diverse in terms of substance, theory and methods. As
such, it deepens scholarly understanding of the L&S
movement and thereby strengthens debates about the
relationship between the ELR movement and the L&S
movement.
Apparently, there are substantive differences and ten-
sions between the ELR movement and the L&S move-
ment, but these cannot be generalised. For this, the rela-
tionship between both differs too much between con-
texts and is too dynamic.
In closing, it can be stated that the first two contribu-
tions of this special issue relate to the boundary between
law and empiricism and the bridging thereof. The third
contribution to this special issue zooms in on the rela-
tionship between legal scholarship and the empirical
study of the law, while the last contribution addresses
the relationship between the ELR movement and other
research traditions that empirically study law. As such,
this special issue on ‘Empirical Legal Research: Fad,
Feud or Fellowship?’ analyses the differences and ten-
sions between the more recent ELR movement, the
L&S movement and traditional legal scholarship.
Thereby, it intends to provide a better understanding of
the academically debated field of legal scholarship.
16. Y-C Chang and P. Wang, The Empirical Foundation of Normative
Arguments in Legal Reasoning, University of Chicago Coase-Sandor
Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper, no. 745 (2016), at 3.
17. Elbers et al., above n. 7.
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